Defense Procurement Act of 2010

[Speaker Hastert]

Mr. McLaughlin, on behalf of the President of the United States, Rick Warder and Secretary of Defense Avery Adams.

Title: Defense Procurement Act of 2010

Executive Summary
To sustain and continue the modernization of forces and capabilities, the procurement request for 2009 includes (what will be fielded in 2009, future years also included in details):
- 150 missiles capable of forming some aspect of a layered missile defense.
- 24 F-22A fighters to replace F-15s.
- 12 C-17 Global Transports to replace C-5s.
- 20 KC-767 Tankers to replace KC-135s.
- 2 Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyers.
- 2 Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships.
- 1 Virginia-class nuclear Attack Submarine to replace 688-class.
- 1 San Antonio-class Landing Platform Dock (a amphibious transport) to replace Austin-class.
- 16 EA-18G Electronic Attack aircraft to replace EA-6Bs.
- 12 HV-22 Vertical Support Aircraft to replace HH-46.
- 18 MV-22 Marine Vertical Aircraft. to replace CH-46
- 12 KC-130J cargo tanker aircraft.
- ½ a Battalion of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles to replace AAAVs.

Detailed Proposal
Missile Defense Agency
- GMI (5 missiles per year)
- PAC-3 (92 missiles per year)
- SM-3 (12 missiles per year)
- THAAD (1 battery per year: 50 missiles/5 launchers/1 radar-control system)

Army
- See Research & Development

Air Force
- 5 F-22A (24 each) squadrons(1 per year, 2009-2013, $133million each, $3192million per year)
- 66 F-35C (24 each) squadron (3 per year, starting with 2 in 2013, until 2035, replacing A-10, then F-16, squadrons; $45million each, $3240million per year)
- 1 C-17 (x 12) squadron (2009; 2 C-5 squadrons to be deactivated)
- 15 KC-767 (10 each) squadrons (2 per year 2009-2016; to replace 17 active force KC-135; replacement for reserve and guard tankers TBD)

Navy
- 1 new-design CVN (2013: 1; 1 more planned for 2018 to replace older CVN)
- 5 Burke-class DDGs (2009: 2, 2010: 3; to join surface strike groups, propose cancellation of at least the 3 2010 units)
- 2 DD(X) DDGs (2013: 1, 2015: 1; to join surface strike groups; integrates 12 key future technologies. 10 more are planned, one per year 2016-2025 to cover the Expeditionary Strike Groups.)
- 6 Freedom-class LCSs (2009: 2, 2010: 2, 2011: 2; propose 2 more in 2011 and 6 per year 2012-2019 and 2 in 2020, to replace Perry-class FFGs 2-for-1)
- 6 Virginia-class SSN (1 per year 2009-2014 ordered; propose increase up to 2 per year starting in 2013, to replace Los Angeles-class SSNs)
- 2 San Antonio-class LPDs (2009: 1, 2010: 1; propose 1 per year in 2011 and 2012 to replace Austin-class LPDs; $1258 million each)
- 16 Electronic Attack (EA-18G x 4) squadrons (4 per year 2009-2012 to replace EA-6B squadrons; $76 million each, $1216million per year)
- 20 Fighter/Attack (F-35C x 12) squadrons (2 per year 2013-2022 to replace F/A-18C squadrons, additional orders possible to replace for F/A-18E/F starting in 2023; $55million each, $1320million per year)
- 4 Vertical Support (HV-22 x 12) squadrons (1 every other year, staring in 2010-2013)
- 18 Patrol (P-8/737 Multimission Maritime Aircraft x 6) squadrons (2 per year 2013-2021, to replace P-3C)

Marine Corps
- 24 Fighter/Attack (F-35B/C x 12) squadrons (2 per year, starting with 1 F-35B in 2012; $54million each, $1296million per year. Once 12 F-35B squadrons are procured, some of the remaining 12 squadrons may be F-35C starting in 2019-2024)
- 4 Electronic Attack (EA-18G x 4) squadrons (4 per year 2013 and 2014 to replace EA-6B squadrons; 2-4 additional squadrons may be requested)
- 16 Medium Marine Vertical (MV-22 x 12) squadrons (1.5 per year 2009-2019, replacing CH-46E squadrons)
- 2 Tanker/Cargo (KC-130J Squadrons, 1 per year 2009 and 2010)
- 3 Battalions of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (half a battalion per year, 2009-2014; replacing the amphibious assault vehicles, one battalion already fielded)

[rickmclaughlin]

Mr. Speaker,

This bill will help to prepare our Armed Forces as they defend freedom and democracy across our nation. We must support our men and women in uniform by providing the necessary resources for them do their job safely and effectively.

I move for UC.

[Jack Jenkins]

Mr. Speaker,

With respect to my colleagues in both parties, I must rise in objection to UC on this matter. I believe that more discussion regarding the direction of the U.S. military and what constitutes proper support for our fighting men out in the fields is required before a vote can be taken on the funding for these projects.

I yield.

[Morrison]

Mr. Speaker,

This legislation obviously protects and aids our military. I am failing to understand why anyone would want to postpone its passage.

I yield

[William Reynolds]

"Mr. Secretary, thank for coming before this body again.

I would like to ask, once again, if you could provide Congress with an estimated overall cost for these proposed measures as well as a break down by branch. I would also like to know how much you intend this country to spend on missile defense, as I note there is no set value for any of the systems you propose.

I do have several specific questions for you, Mr. Secretary, beyond these simple cost concerns, but I will save them until you have the time to gather the requested information."

[Avery Adams]

Congressman,

Here is the breakdown as best can be provided to a general question. I am more that willing to go into details with specific questions.

Total Procurement: ~$105,300million
Includes new, modifications, spares, and replacement procurement

By Service/subtype
Army: $15,861million
Aircraft: $3,781million
Missiles: $1,716million
Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles: $2,241million
Ammunition: $2,323million
Other: $5,808million

Navy/USMC: $40,053million
Aircraft: $14,198million
Missiles/Torpedoes: $3,655million
Ammunition: $1,178million
Shipbuilding & Conversion: $11,774million
USMC unique: $1,860million
Other: $7,408million

Air Force: $43,849million
Aircraft: $16,165million
Missiles: $7,412million
Ammunition: $1,392million
Other: $18,904million

Other: $5,536million
Defense-Wide: $3,642million
Hazard Disposal: $1898million

Select Programs
Missile Defense Agency (some procurement through services)
- GMI (5 missiles per year; ~$1.2B includes procurement, upgrades, launch silos, sensor integration, and command&control)
- PAC-3 (92 missiles per year; $4.5m each = $414m)
- SM-3 (12 missiles per year; ~$10m each = $120m)
- THAAD (1 battery per year: 50 missiles/5 launchers/1 radar-control system; ~$8m per missile, ~$50m per radar-control system, ~$5m per launcher = $475m)

Army
- Land Warrior Systems (~15,000 units; for 3 Infantry and 3 Heavy Brigades) $2,055m

Air Force
- 1 F-22A (24 each) squadrons($133million each, $3192m)
- 1 C-17 (x 12) squadron ($329m each, $3,948m)
- 2 KC-767 (x 10) squadrons ($200m each, $4,000m total)

Navy
- 2 Burke-class DDGs ($1.2B each, $2.4B)
- 2 Freedom-class LCSs ($220million each; $440million)
- 1 Virginia-class SSN ($2.3B, to replace Los Angeles-class SSNs)
- 1 San Antonio-class LPDs ($1,258 million each; to replace Austin-class LPDs)
- 4 Electronic Attack (EA-18G x 4) squadrons ($76 million each, $1,216million; to replace EA-6B)

Marine Corps
- 1.5 Medium Marine Vertical (MV-22 x 12) squadrons (replacing CH-46E squadrons; $110m each, $1,980m)
- 1 Tanker/Cargo (KC-130J x 12) squadrons ($66m each, $792m)
- 1/2 Battalion of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle ($7.3million each x 50; $365million)

[Jack Jenkins]

Mr. Secretary,

I have a few questions for you:

Why is the Army's budget a third the size of the Air Force's and Navy's?

What is the cost of the CVN, which is included in the legislation, but not in your list of expenses?

How much would you estimate an upgrade in body armor would cost for our fighting men?

[Avery Adams]

"Why is the Army's budget a third the size of the Air Force's and Navy's?"

Congressman,
The Army budget has consistently been smaller than that of the two other services for a number of reasons. Firstly, the air and sea systems cost considerably more - this year is no exception.

Second, we are between the procurement cycle of the Stryker and the FCS. As you can see Land Warrior accounts for a large chunk off the Army budget; we have in fact tripled the procurement rate for these systems, so that as the first FCS Brigade comes on line (2014), all "leg" and dismounted Infantry will have the initial operating system (Spiral 1).

The reason we felt this was important was that it bring the inherent network to all warfighters prior to FCS and allows the integration of the Spiral 2 upgrades as the FCS systems are introduced into the brigades.

"What is the cost of the CVN, which is included in the legislation, but not in your list of expenses?"

We did not include CVN-21 directly into the 2009 executive summary because the first ship will not be delivered until 2013. The production cost for the ship which we will incur this year (which is the last planned annual increment) is approximately $3,290million. Another $441million is allocated for early production of the second vessel. In addition, $261million is noted for continued R&D effort in this program.

"How much would you estimate an upgrade in body armor would cost for our fighting men?"

For body armor we have both the normal replacement of the "Interceptor" system (~$32m split between Army "Other"/ Navy-USMC "USMC unique", with a limited amount in Air Force "other"), and the new system which is integrated into the Land Warrior program. The older system has worked quite well, though it has gone through some slight modifications. The biggest problems were weight (thought this was a major improvement over previous systems), fit (again an improvement), and flexibility (somewhat improved but still a major issue).

The new "Land Warrior" armor is built into the system to allow for better fit with integrated equipment system. It reduced weight (slightly) and bulk (significantly), with equivalent protection and improved coverage (a few areas had gaps). The big area was flexibility, this system allows for greater agility than the previous system.

I hope this has answered your questions, please let me know if there are additional details I can provide.

[William Reynolds]

"Mr. Secretary, once again let me thank you for your cooperatives in coming before us again.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I must admit that I have a few questions for you now that I've looked over this budget and heard the comments of my fellow Democrat from Georgia.

To begin with, I'm looking at this carrier business. First off, let me say that I'm a big fan of carriers. And not for the traditional Congressional pork reasons either, as my district doesn't exactly get much in the way of ship construction. However, I have here a report from retired 3-star Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the Navy's Transformation Office. Let me also remark, before I read off some of this, that Admiral Cebrowski has the full backing of Rear Admiral Jay Cohen, head of the Office of Naval Research.

Cebrowski has written to me about the mini-carrier design that he, and the Navy, have been proposing for several years now. I'll read a bit of his letters. "With recent advances in technology, as well as the Pentagon's Small Diameter Bomb Program, the capability of our aircraft are increasing dramatically. As such, we may be in a position where we're going to run out of targets before we run out of war. And what that means then is you have the possibility of moving to very, very small aircraft carriers in multiplicity in order to deal with the diversity of the threat."

Now, I hope that, as Secretary of Defense you are familiar with the long standing debate about mini-carriers. Frankly, every Naval officer I've ever talked to has been a large proponent of converting a significant portion of our naval based air platforms into mini-carriers, as the missions which face the United States these days seldom require the full capabilities of a larger carrier. That is not to say that we should scrap our larger carriers, but tactically the Department of the Navy has been arguing for years that mini-carriers should be used and constructed in order to help reduce costs, reduce manpower, and improve speed of deployment. And yet, whenever we build a carrier, we get something the size of a Nimitz. So, Mr. Secretary, my question to you is: why? We have the technology, we have the manpower, and there is certainly the need, especially in terms of increasing our flexibility in places like Iraq. It doesn't bring certain members of Congress the kind of pork they've come to know and love, but I would hope we wouldn't be taking that into consideration. Is there a reason why we are not constructing these smaller carriers?

Secondly, in regards to body armor, I have heard tell that one of the largest problems with body armor was not fit, or weight. But rather, the installation of ceramic plates to cover certain vulnerable areas of our soldiers. There was a debate about this back in 2005 and, as usual, the problem has not been entirely solved yet. Are plans still in effect to increase the safety and security of infantry men and women?

Thirdly, in the event that your proposed FCS program fails to pass the House, are you planning to change this procurement package to include alternative programs to help our ground troops?

Fourthly, what sort of success rate could we expect from these missile defense programs of yours? The programs I have read about having the highest success rates are, frankly, the nose-cone mounted laser weaponry already installed on a significant number of experimental aircraft. This technology has been under production for years and a usable variant was provided to us by Northrop Grumman in 2007. Where are these anti-weapon systems that we know can actually work?

Fifthly, I have noticed that the vast majority of the listed spending goings towards the Marine corps this year is, predictably, aircraft. I hope I don't have to highlift for you how ridiculous this is. I am, hopeful, however, to see that there is a large category for 'other'. As the Marine Corps has never traditionally focused on the procurement of aircraft, I hope you can give us some insight into what 'other' means. The Marines are not an aircraft-centric group, although the pilots within the Corps would likely try to convince you they are. The fact remains that the vast majority of the Marine Corps money and time is spent on the ground. I hope that you can show us that this remains the case in this budget.

Finally, the Procurement Budget for this year is $105,300 million dollars out of a total military budget of 490,720 million dollars, as proposed by the President. In 2005, this budget was approximately 402,000 million dollars and procurement was 74,904 million dollars. The procurement budget's portion of the budgetary pie has grown by 15-16%, mostly being spent on new airplanes. Where is this money coming from? Could it not have been better spend on increasing troop pay rates? How do you justify drastically increasing the amount of money spent on procurement when our troops are so underpaid? An airplane cannot patrol the streets in Baghdad, so why are we buying so many?"

[Avery Adams]

Congressman, I will attempt to address your lengthy and loaded questions as best I can.

“Mini-carriers”: Frankly, this subject has been studied time and time again since the early 1970s. Each time the proposals are rejected for a variety of significant reasons. As a former naval aviator this is a subject important to me. There are a variety of options, the “super carrier” of today, a mid-size carrier (STOVL aircraft optional), and the mini-carrier (STOVL only).

The Nimitz-class (1,092 feet long, 97,000tons displacement) normally deploys with about 68 aircraft (46 fighters, 8 anti-sub, 6 helicopters, 4 electronic attack, 4 early warning) effectively, and can employ even more for heavy sustained operations (90-100 total). Since it is nuclear powered it can allocate more fuel to aircraft operations and off-load to conventional-powered escorts. They are extremely survivable; manning will be significantly decreased in the CVN-21 and will be capable of operation of both manned and unmanned aircraft jointly. Additionally, these vessels can provide a large platform to base heli-borne forces deployed aboard (Haiti and Afghanistan for example).

Mid-size carriers would be similar to the Essex-class carriers of WWII, the Amphibious Assault/Dock landing ships we use today, and the carriers used by France, Russia, and soon by the United Kingdom. 700-900 feet long, 25,000 to 50,000+ tons, they can be either nuclear or conventional powered – but due to size nuclear plants are generally too small and conventional plants use too much fuel for long-term deployments. Air Wing would total about 35-50 aircraft, but size would be limited due to landing area length. If and when such a capability is needed in low intensity conflicts it can be filled by the 12 amphibious vessel carrying Harrier STOVL aircraft.

The mini-carrier, capable only of operating STOVL aircraft, and then usually less that 20, are still at least 600 feet long, 15,000-20,000 tons, conventional powered only, and not as fast, sustainable, or survivable as the supercarrier. It should be noted that STOVL-aircraft do not have the range, payload, or overall performance of catapult launched aircraft. In essence it would take 4 or 5 “mini-carriers” to carry the equivalent number of less capable aircraft.

Speed, mass, mobility and concentration of force remain key elements of operational effectiveness. Therefore, this debate will continue to reach the same conclusion – our large deck carrier force is the most lethal, coherent, flexible and sustainable asset. To quote the former Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Vern Clark, “there is no more powerful, no more capable platform anywhere in the world than an American large deck aircraft carrier”. Coupled with the amphibs if backup or less capable ships are all that is needed, the super carrier provides unmatched and flexible capabilities.

Body Armor: Weight, fit, bulk, flexibility, and protection are ALL issues when designing and providing body armor. In fact, by 2005 the “Interceptor” helmet and vest system protection was one of the superior factors, with ceramic armor plates capable of providing protection against multiple hits by 7.62mm in the chest & torso regions. Interceptor “+” add-ons provide ballistic protection against 9mm rounds for extremities (neck, shoulders, arms, groin and legs, as well as sides of the torso and underarms) in modular extension kits. The Interceptor kit weighs about 24 pounds, with the full “+” additions adding 7 pounds not including other combat equipment; all told this can be 50-60+ pounds. Now a full-up 7.62mm/IED/blast body protection kit weighs in at about 50 pounds itself, without combat equipment.

Frankly, with such a combat load our ground warriors can not fight effectively – especially against insurgent-type fighters carrying 10-20 pounds total. The key is to increase the protection of the individual while not decreasing their combat effectiveness. We can weigh the soldier down with infinite protection, but the result would be a slow moving target.

The initial Land Warrior armor system incorporates similar protection levels as Interceptor+ in a system that provided greater flexibility, less bulk, and slightly less weight. Since it was designed along side the other soldier combat systems it ensures better compatibility and placement on the body. Ceramic plates and composite fabric materials are used in combination to achieve the desired results.

FCS: The FCS program is a “system of systems”, designed to provide the next generation of key systems in an integrated network to ensure effective interoperability. While some specific systems within the FCS program may have room for debate, as a whole it provides for the full spectrum of conventional ground combat together with the Land Warrior. Additionally, with the spiral system and vehicle frames, both programs allow for future upgrades to be easily and rapidly integrated into the force.

Now the Congress may continue to harp on cost, but it should be remembered that this program basically replaces, among other things, the M1 tank, the M2/3 cavalry/infantry vehicle, M109 self-propelled howitzer, M1026 self-propelled mortar, recon helicopter, command, medical, engineer, recovery, along with missile systems and the network which will allow these systems to communicate and operate together from the start. Logistics, deploy-ability, and sustainability are enhanced with frame systems allowing common parts and the support network. Continuing to delay this program deprives our warfighters from receiving the complete package of integrated systems that will carry them into the future and provide for unparalleled combat effectiveness.

Missile Defense: Frankly congressman that exact probability of kill (pK) is classified.
While a single interceptor from any system might have, for example, a 50% pK, the fact is we would fire multiple missiles at each threat, then considering we would have 3-5 interceptors per missile if fired individually during the engagement period (and not ripple fired, more than one interceptor launched at once), the overall pK would be between 87.5-96.875%. This is the reason that we have sought to deploy a layered missile defense system.

The current systems that can deploy (not the long-range GBI) are they are generally for terminal defense or of limited range. The Israeli Arrow system, for example, has greater range and height, which opens the engagement envelope. The THAAD system and development of the upgraded SM-3 and especially KEI will enhance our current systems.

Directed-Energy systems have developed significantly over the last decade, though while some limited Chemical Laser demonstration systems could be pressed into service, the development of Solid-state and Hybrid systems are where the true breakthroughs in deployable and sustainable systems will be. This discussion would probably be better suited for the R&D appropriations.

Marine Corps Funding: As the Congress knows, the Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy, as does its budget. The “USMC Unique” category is specifically for that, for items such as the EFV, whereby aviation procurement falls under Navy “Aircraft”, same with missiles and ammunition (ect). The Marine Corps, with both ~25% of the fixed- and ~50% of the rotary-wing aircraft in the Navy inventory, does indeed have a significant portion of the aviation assets.

Current Marine Corps aviation efforts is to upgrade to KC-130J and replace the CH-47 with MV-22s. Future efforts in upcoming years will be replacing the EA-6B with the EA-18G, and the AV-8B and F/A-18C/D with the F-35B and/or –C.

Budget: Over the past five years the procurement portion of the overall defense budget has gone from 19.5% of the defense budget to 22%. So yes, procurement has, over the past half decade, taken a bit larger piece of the pie, but it does now change significantly the levels or monetary increases in other areas. The one exception of a monetary cut is in family housing, which has been consistently decreasing as off-base housing allowances continue to become more common.

While there has been some fluctuation in force levels, it has not been significantly increased, so even accounting for GDP adjustments, the Personnel budget did not need as significant an increase as Procurement. We have sought to link military pay raises with adjustments in per capita GDP change on a yearly basis. Additionally we seek to close the "Pay Gap", the difference between comparable civil and military pay and benefits. Between 1992-2001 this hovered over 10% (10.5-13%), but decreased to 6% by 2004, and was at 5% last year. Though not a Procurement issue, we would like to continue closing the gap by .25-.5% per year until it is zero, that way we won't overwhelm the budget all at once.

There are more future threats than just low-intensity conflict, but the combat impact of a single new fighter or ship could be quite significant in heavy anti-access defense areas, against large capable forces, and providing vital enabling support. Why are we buying so many or this or that? Because frankly the administrations in the 1990s failed to ensure that the modernization of forces after the post-Cold War draw down. We have in effect skipped a generation of technology, so the new systems may be pricey, but replacement of older technology is already overdue to provide out forces with the most effective systems for today and the future.

[Jack Jenkins]

Mr. Secretary, I have a few follow up questions, but first, I’d like to apologize for not supporting this program simply because you tell us to. I was in the army for a long time, and I took orders for a long time, and I saw a whole lot of men die in my arms and all around me. Many of those deaths were because, as you say, in the 1990s there was not a large leap in terms of replacement of Cold War technology. In that, I agree with you that replacements are necessary, and upgrades should be researched. However, many of them were also because of incomplete information provided to us, so our decision-making capabilities were impaired and/or non-existent. So there we have two sides of a coin: one that suggests supporting your legislation so that we can get this technology to the troops as fast as possible, and the other that smells a rat and doubts how fast we can get that technology and how effective it will be. It's not that I don't trust you, it's just that in the past defense contractors have been known to try and suck all they can out of Uncle Sam. I’m trying to satisfy both sides of that coin, and protect this country with this session and the previous one. I’ve learned the hard way not to take everything at face value, Mr. Secretary, as have many others here on both sides of the aisle. In turn, I ask that you bear with us while we conduct this questioning, so that as much information as possible is made available, and options are produced so that we can make the best decision for this country.

Pardon me for my long windedness; I will try to be brief with my questions:

First, will all the new ships you are building be DD(x) technology ships? If so, what is the status, and budget of that program at the moment? I have several inside sources in regards to that program that are saying that there may be problems, but I’d prefer to receive an update from yourself, as I trust your opinion more. This may be a private discussion if you prefer.

In relation to the concept of weight of the body armor, I do agree that 50-60 pounds of armor per individual is too much. After all, at Ranger School we were trained to carry 65-90 pounds of combat equipment on 200 mile tactical deployments while getting less sleep and less food than a normal soldier. Remember, this training is for the elite of the elite in terms of soldier, so asking a normal soldier to carry similar weight, which for comparison is basically that of a backstreet boy, is ludicrous. My question is, how are we going to significantly reduce that number? Understandably, Land Warrior is an improvement over the interceptor armor, the question is how much of one, and are there better systems in the pipeline.

As for the FCS programs, the merit of this project has been debated ad nauseam by both parties, and yourself. Merits and flaws of the systems aside, what is the contingency plan should the FCS not make it through the House, which I might add is a real possibility at the moment. Are there changes you can recommend to the FCS in a new bill? Would you be opposed to crafting new legislation in conjunction with members of congress such as myself or my colleagues?


Mr. Secretary, I am not standing before you today saying that we need to cut Defense, abandon our military or any such things. I just want the absolute best for both our military, and our taxpayers. That means cutting wasteful programs, not every program. And it does not even mean cutting them, it means amending them, finding the source of the waste and determining the cause. Tedious and possibly a wild goose chase, yes, but a job that needs doing. I will work with you in any way possible to craft legislation that meets both of our expectations, if you are interested, please contact me.

[Avery Adams]

Congressman, I understand and appreciate the duty and responsibility of Congress in the matter of Defense appropriations. I too take seriously the responsibility I have as Secretary of Defense across the spectrum of policy, appropriations, and management, day in and day out.

DD(X): Like the FCS, DD(X) is not just about buying new ships; it is about developing the technologies that will enable an effective future force. DD(X) would not only be the first in this next generation family of ships, it would also be the test bed for many of the technologies; just as the Spruance-class destroyer served as the test bed for many of the technologies in the current generation of surface combatants. Like the previous generation’s Ticonderoga-class, the CG(X) will basically be a DD(X) with expanded air/missile defense capabilities, and will form the “hub” of fleet air defense. It is our hope that FF(X) will integrate these capabilities into an evolved system, like the Burke-class destroyers did.

The DD(X) technology will be the basis for the follow on CG(X) and FF(X) mentioned in the R&D appropriations, and has a direct influence the LCS frame and its mission modules. The integration of DD(X) technology increases with each LCS spiral; the early few test ships had very little of it, those now under construction and planned for the future will have ever increasing amounts of DD(X) tech as it is shrunk; but a single LCS-size ship will not integrate all the DD(X) technologies to the full extent.

So in essence, no, not all the surface combatants we are constructing are full DD(X) technology ships; all will however leverage that technology to some degree. DD(X) and CG(X) will be “full” DD(X) tech; LCS vessels will use it in bits and pieces, while the FF(X) concept will essentially be a “hybrid” using evolved DD(X) technology. The majority of the engineering models (with the exception of the integrated dual-band radar which was about two years behind) completed their prototypes in 2005 and 2006, and transitioned to systems design and development.

Cost wise the estimates are for the first two ships to cost ~$3.3-$3.7 Billion each, with the average procurement cost after 5-8 ships at ~$2.6-2.75Billion. Construction of the first ship began in 2008, with delivery expected in 2012 and commissioning the following year. This is over course separate from the already expended R&D costs for the various systems. I am more that happy to go into a detailed discussing on planned shipbuilding and aircraft transition in separate testimony.

Body Armor: As I am sure you are aware, Special Forces generally operate with less armor than “regular” force, specifically because the weight hinders their movement. As mentioned, the spiral 1 Land Warrior (LWs1) armor offers Interceptor+ protection at about Interceptor(non+) mobility and weight (~25lbs LWs1 vs ~31lbs I+). The Spiral 2 system now under development seeks to reduce weight by 20% (objective to ~20lbs; threshold at ~23lbs/8% reduction) for introduction in the 2014-2016 timeframe. LWs3 armor, which we hope to introduce in the 2020-2025 timeframe, would seek I+ protection at 15-18lbs, with the full-up 7.62mm/IED/blast body protection enhancements at 25-30lbs, about half the weight we can offer today.

Future R&D is looking at how to decrease the weight without sacrificing protection through such concepts as nano-technology and powered armor; but those concepts are far from operational and we will rely on a combination of composite fibers and stiff ceramic plates for the foreseeable future.

FCS: I am more than happy to work with interested parties to tailor the suite of FCS programs, however if the program is cut, these programs would essentially have to be developed separately and introduced over time. The idea is that if we can develop and introduce them simultaneously in and integrated fashion, it will provide units with a finely meshed system, rather than a hodgepodge that needs to be refined in operations. We are ensuring the systems are designed to operate together in terms of combat, deployment, and logistics prior to individual introduction, so that the unit suite, rather then just the individual systems, have the capabilities needed for the Future Force.

[Jack Jenkins]

Mr. Secretary,

In regards to DD(x), my main concern is whether or not Lockheed Martin has solved the problem regarding their portion of the radar that has been exploding on the test beds. This is something that could be considered a serious setback, so it should be considered whether or not to give the full contract to Raytheon, who I understand are better suited to designing and building the dual band radar than Lockheed. I mean, from what I've heard at every setback Lockheed has had to bring in people from Raytheon to solve it, and they even disregarded and misled inquiries into earlier problems that have led to this latest one.

[Avery Adams]

Congressman,
The Lockheed Martin effort to prototype the S-Band, Volume Search Radar was indeed the major issue that delayed the Dual-Band Radar from moving forward into system design and development. Part of delay stemmed from a decision to switch from an L-band system nearly a year after the program began; Raytheon then subcontracted to LM since they have S-band experience. As identified in the 14 June 2005 GAO report on DD(X), “the individual radiating elements that are the essence of the volume search radar, encountered difficulties when a key component failed in testing.” As the result of significant additional testing and design changes, by July 2005 it was reported that the individual radiating elements were working satisfactorily and the VSR EDM array was released for production and the VSR EDM array was delivered to Wallops Island land based testing in June of 2006. This testing was completed in late-2007/early-2008 and entered the system design and development phase; with validation of the operational version expected to begin in late-2009/early-2010.

[Jack Jenkins]

OOC: I apologize for this, because i think I'm working with a wider base of knowledge than anyone else. My dad actually works for Raytheon, and the exploding on the test bay at Lockheed is an actual problem that apparently happened recently and continues to happen. Raytheon warned Lockheed about problems they were having with overheating with several components, Lockheed assured them they were fixed, and now they're requesting Raytheon people to go fix the problems for them.